This paper examines how corporate charitable contributions to independent directors-affiliated charities (affiliated donations) affect board monitoring effectiveness. We find that firms with weaker corporate governance tend to make affiliated donations. Moreover, CEO compensation is greater, while CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS), CEO turnover to performance sensitivity, and reporting quality of the firm are lower at firms that make affiliated donations. We further link monitoring ineffectiveness to committee assignments. Specifically, we find poor compensation practices (reporting quality) only at firms that make charitable contributions to charities affiliated with compensation (audit) committee members. Our results are stronger when corporate governance is weaker, and when corporate donations are made to charities affiliated with committee chairs or multiple committee members. Interestingly, corporate donations to charities affiliated with any independent directors affect the CEO turnover decisions because the entire board is engaged in such decisions. This paper contributes to the corporate governance literature by uncovering a new determinant of director independence, incremental to those identified based on business transactions, social connections, and director appointment decisions.
Introduction
The monitoring roles of independent directors of corporate boards have long been examined in the literature of corporate governance (e.g., Weisbach 1988; Core, Larcker, and Holthausen 1999; Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash 2011; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2016) .
Conventionally, director independence is defined based on whether the director has a material relationship with the company that may create a conflict of interest and interfere with the exercise of independent judgement in carrying out director responsibilities. Based on the NYSE rule, a director is not independent if the director is a current employee or an immediate family member of the director is a current executive officer of an organization that receives, from the company, payments for property or services exceeding $1 million or 2% of the organization's consolidated gross revenue in any of the past three years.
In contrast to payments to directors-affiliated organizations via business transactions, corporate charitable contributions to directors-affiliated charities, regardless of their amount, do not disqualify director independence.
1 Information on corporate charitable contributions is included in the Form 990-PF, filed annually at the IRS, which has been largely overlooked by corporate governance research until very recently (Masulis and Reza 2015) . Based on the NYSE rule, only corporate donations that exceed $1 million or 2% of the consolidated gross revenue of a director's affiliated charity are required to be disclosed on the company's website, in its annual proxy statement, or in its 10-K filing. The amount of corporate donations to directors-affiliated charities is often much larger than that of director annual compensation (which has been under the shareholders' and regulators' scrutiny for its potential influence on directors' monitoring incentives), and it could create conflict of interest and impair the director's independent judgement in carrying out their monitoring responsibilities.
In this paper, we first examine how the strength of corporate governance affects firms' decisions to make charitable contributions to independent directors-affiliated charities (affiliated donations). We find that firms with weak corporate governance (with a large board, a combined role of CEO and chairman of the board, low CEO ownership, and low institutional ownership)
are more likely to make affiliated donations and tend to make large donations. To make our interpretation less ambiguous, we contrast affiliated donations with firms' charitable donations not affiliated with independent directors (unaffiliated donations). We find that only affiliated donations are correlated with weak corporate governance, suggesting that affiliated donations may mainly reflect corporate governance issues. Independent directors, whose affiliated charities receive charitable contributions from the firm, may have conflict of interest and impaired incentives and/or judgement to effectively monitor the management.
We next examine how affiliated donations affect the effectiveness of board monitoring decisions, starting with looking at compensation practices. We find that firms that make affiliated donations pay their CEOs 9.9% more than firms without affiliated donations after controlling for other determinants of CEO compensation. Moreover, we find that the portfolio delta of the CEO (pay-for-performance sensitivity, PPS) at firms with affiliated donations is lower than that at firms without affiliated donations by $500,000.
We conduct three additional analyses that reinforce our interpretation of the results regarding CEO compensation. First, we contrast affiliated with unaffiliated donations and find that only affiliated donations affect compensation practices. Second, positing that different board committees hold different governance roles, we hypothesize that charitable donations affiliated with directors on compensation committees have stronger effects on compensation practices.
Contrasting compensation committee members with other board members, we find that compensation practices are distorted only by corporate donations to charities affiliated with compensation committee members. Third, we examine within the compensation committee whether corporate donations made to charities affiliated with the committee chair or more committee members affect CEO compensation to a greater degree. Interestingly, we find that CEO compensation level is higher and PPS is lower at firms that make affiliated donations to the compensation committee chair, to multiple committee members, or to a large fraction of committee members (above sample median).
One may argue that the observed association between affiliated donations and poor compensation practices might be driven by omitted director characteristics even though an array of corporate governance measures are included in our regression analysis as control variables. To address such concerns, we conduct a subsample analysis retaining only directors who serve on two corporate boards in a given year, of which only one firm makes donations to the director's affiliated charities. The specification with director fixed effects yields a similar result: CEO compensation is greater and PPS is lower at firms with affiliated donations than at those firms without affiliated donations.
We next examine whether the effect of affiliated donations depends on the strength of corporate governance. In other word, does strong governance mitigate the effect of affiliated donations on compensation practices? We find that affiliated donations distort compensation practices mainly at firms with weak corporate governance. Specifically, affiliated donations are associated with higher CEO compensation and lower PPS at firms that have a lower fraction of conventionally independent directors (below the sample median), a lower fraction of conventionally and socially independent directors, and a lower fraction of conventionally independent directors after correcting for co-opted directors (who became a board member after the CEO took the corner office; Coles et al. 2016) . Moreover, we find a stronger effect of affiliated donations on compensation decisions at firms that have a larger fraction of busy directors, lower outside directors' ownership, lower ownership by the top five institutional investors, and at firms with longer CEO tenure.
Given that those independent directors whose affiliated charities receive corporate donations have conflict of interest, and perhaps distorted incentives in performing monitoring roles, we redefine such directors as dependent and revisit the literature examining the link between CEO compensation and board independence. The literature has mixed findings. For example, Core et al. (1999) find a puzzling positive correlation between CEO compensation and the fraction of conventionally independent directors, while Hwang and Kim (2009) find a negative correlation using conventionally and socially independent directors for the universe of S&P 100 companies. We run horse race tests among four director independence measures:
conventionally independent, conventionally and socially independent, conventionally independent corrected for co-opted directors, and conventionally independent corrected for donation-affiliated directors. We find lower CEO compensation and higher PPS only at firms with a large fraction of independent directors whose charities do not receive corporate donations.
In addition to compensation practices, we examine the effect of affiliated donations on firm's financial reporting quality and CEO replacement decisions. We find that at firms with affiliated donations, the quality of financial reporting is poor and CEO turnover-to-performance sensitivity is low. We measure reporting quality by accrual quality ( and Flammer (2016) shows that the adoption of CSR-related shareholder proposals that narrowly passed the majority vote leads to positive announcement returns and superior accounting performance via increases in labor productivity and sales growth.
On the other hand, Cheng, Hong, and Shue (2014) find that corporate goodness reflects an agency problem because it is negatively associated with governance strength and after-tax insider 2 Masulis and Reza (2015) identify donations to directors' charitable causes by the overlaps between the top three categories of corporate charitable contributions and the organization types of directors' charitable affiliations. In contrast, we match the names of non-profit organizations that receive a company's charitable contributions in any given year with the names of charities that the company's independent directors are affiliated with.
ownership, and the passage of shareholder governance proposals leads to slower growth in corporate goodness.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses and describes our empirical strategies. Section 3 describes the data on affiliated donations. Section 4 examines economic determinants of affiliated donations. Section 5 presents the empirical results on the effect of affiliated donations on compensation practices. Section 6 reports effects of affiliated donations on financial reporting quality and CEO replacement decisions. Section 7 concludes.
Hypothesis Development and Empirical Strategies
Directors' charitable causes benefit from donations made by a company even though those directors are unlikely to pocket the donations. As a result, such directors may become more sympathetic when monitoring and disciplining managers, which "interferes with the exercise of independent judgment in carrying out director responsibilities" and changes the status of those directors from conventionally independent to non-independent (one with a conflict of interest).
Thus, corporate affiliated donations can be viewed as side payments to directors in addition to direct compensation for their board services, and the amount of the former tends to be much larger than that of the latter ($1.4 million vs. $0.2 million on average for the S&P 500 firms).
We test the effectiveness of three types of monitoring decisions that independent directors make: CEO compensation, CEO turnover, and financial reporting quality. First, we examine whether firms that make affiliated donations tend to grant more generous compensation package to the CEO and provide a weaker link between pay and performance. We measure PPS by the portfolio delta of a CEO's equity holdings (Core and Guay 2002) . Second, we examine whether firms that make affiliated donations tend to have poor reporting quality. We measure the quality of financial reporting using accrual quality followed Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
Data and Univariate Analysis
Our sample is the S&P 500 index companies as of December 31, 2012. We extract directors' affiliation data from the BoardEx database, which includes the board membership and committee assignment of each director, the director's affiliated not-for-profit organizations (return of organization exempt from income tax), grant maker web sites, annual reports, printed application guidelines, the philanthropic press, and various other sources. Generally, all grants of over $10,000 are included for all foundations with a total giving amount of at least $5,000,000
(roughly, the top 1000 donors each year). 3 Only corporate donations of at least $1,000 are kept in the database, which is helpful for leaving out corporate matching programs of employee donations.
Using Python function ratio, we match directors' affiliated charities listed in BoardEx with charities that received corporate donations by charity names. The initial sample comprises perfect matches returned by running ratio. We then supplement the data by manually checking all potential matches with a matching score greater than 0.85.
We present summary statistics of the donation data in ROA, and market-to-book), and appear to be less risky (lower market-to-book, stock return volatility, and R&D investments) than firms not making affiliated donations. Moreover, firms that make affiliated donations differ along various dimensions of corporate governance.
Specifically, CEOs of these firms tend to serve as the chairman of the board of directors, have a shorter tenure as CEO, and lower equity ownership. These firms also tend to have larger boards, more independent boards, their independent directors are more likely to be socially connected with the CEO, and the fraction of directors hired after the CEO takes position is smaller.
Furthermore, ownership by the top five institutional investors is lower and the average director compensation is greater at firms making affiliated donations.
Determinants of Affiliated Donations
We now examine the economic determinants of corporate donations to charities affiliated with independent directors. We focus on how corporate governance is associated with affiliated donations and use a regression specification similar to that in Masulis and Reza (2015 Social connections between independent directors and the CEO are a weak determinant of the amount of affiliated donations when other aspects of governance and firm financials are accounted for. Thus, the charitable donation channel through which independent directors and the CEO are connected is unlikely to be a mere manifestation of the previously documented social connections. Interestingly, we observe a lower tendency and a smaller amount of affiliated donations at firms with a larger fraction of independent directors appointed by the CEO (coopted directors), perhaps because it is not necessary to donate to charities affiliated with those independent directors who are loyal to the CEO due to appointment decisions. We include social connections and director co-option as control variables in all subsequent analyses on the effects of affiliated donations.
Among control variables of firm characteristics, larger firms and firms with greater ROA are more likely to make and make larger donations, both affiliated and unaffiliated. This is perhaps because these firms have more resources for charitable activities. Contrary to the univariate result, firms with greater R&D investments are more likely to make and make larger affiliated donations, but not unaffiliated donations. In addition, we find that firms with higher financial leverage make larger affiliated donations, but not larger unaffiliated donations.
CEO Compensation
In this section, we examine how affiliated donations affect firms' compensation practices.
More specifically, we examine the effect of affiliated donations on the level of CEO annual compensation and the PPS for the CEO.
Baseline specification
In Table 4 , we examine how CEO compensation is related to affiliated donations. Two dependent variables are used -the logarithm of total annual pay in thousands of dollars (TDC1 in ExecuComp) and portfolio equity incentives (Delta). In Panel A, we test how CEO compensation practices are related to the firm's decision to make affiliated donations and the size of these donations. As the results show, CEO total pay is significantly greater (by 9.9%) at firms that make affiliated donations (Column 1). However, greater total pay comes with significantly lower equity incentives (lower by $500,000, Column 3). Such results are obtained after controlling for firm financial characteristics and governance quality. The results are also robust when we replace the indicator for affiliated donations by the dollar amount of affiliated donations (Columns 2 and 4).
Regarding control variables, as expected, we find that CEO total pay and portfolio delta are greater at larger firms and firms with greater market-to-book ratios. Total pay is also greater when the CEO serves as chairman of the board. Portfolio delta is greater when the change in ROA is smaller the previous year, when stock return is less volatile, when the firm uses less financial leverage, and when CEO ownership is higher. We find no correlation between CEO compensation and board size, board independence based on the conventional definition of independent directors, or ownership by top five institutional investors.
Our results thus far show that corporate charitable donations to organizations affiliated with independent directors are significantly associated with greater CEO pay and weaker equity incentives. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that affiliated donations are a new channel through which the CEO befriends independent directors, which in turn affects monitoring outcomes. To further strengthen this interpretation and alleviate the concerns that some omitted factors affecting decisions on both affiliated donations and CEO compensation, we explore the variation in affiliated donations based on the independent director's committee assignment. As stated in H2, because the compensation committee is vital in designing CEO compensation packages, we hypothesize that the effect of affiliated donations on CEO compensation should be stronger when the affiliated director serves on the compensation committee. Among firms making donations to charities affiliated with directors on the compensation committee, the effect is expected to be stronger if the committee chair is among the affiliated directors, or if the charities of multiple compensation committee members receive the company's charitable contributions.
We test H2 by splitting affiliated donations into two categories: (1) donations to charities affiliated with one or more independent directors serving on the compensation committee, and (2) donations to charities affiliated with independent directors who are not compensation committee members. Out of the 811 affiliated donations used in this table (fewer than 1,020 due to missing control variables), 606 donations are affiliated with compensation committee members and 205
are not. The results, presented in Columns 1 and 5 of Table 4 , Panel B, are consistent with our hypothesis. CEO pay is significantly greater only when the firm makes donations to charities affiliated with compensation committee members. Moreover, we find that CEO portfolio delta is significantly lower at firms making donations to charities affiliated with the compensation committee, but is unrelated to corporate donations to charities affiliated with independent directors not serving on the compensation committee.
We test H3 by splitting donations affiliated with the compensation committee into two subgroups along three dimensions. First, we contrast donations affiliated with the committee chair with donations affiliated with non-chair members of the compensation committee. As shown in Columns 2 and 6, donations affiliated with the compensation committee chair have a stronger effect on CEO total pay and portfolio delta. Second, we compare donations affiliated with two or more compensation committee members and those affiliated with a single member.
We find that donations affiliated with multiple members of the compensation committee have stronger effects on CEO compensation (Columns 3 and 7). Third, we compare donations affiliated with a large fraction of independent directors on the compensation committee (above sample median) and those affiliated with a small fraction of directors the committee. As shown in Columns 4 and 8, the effects of affiliated donations are stronger when they are affiliated with a large fraction of directors on the compensation committee.
In all specifications, we include affiliated donations unrelated to the compensation committee as an explanatory variable and it remains irrelevant for CEO compensation. We also include an indicator for the 434 unaffiliated donations as an explanatory variable in all specifications. We do not expect unaffiliated donations to affect CEO compensation.
Consistently, neither CEO total pay nor equity incentives are significantly related to unaffiliated charitable donations.
Overall, the results in Table 4 show a significant positive relation between affiliated donations and CEO total pay, and a significant negative relation between affiliated donations and CEO equity incentives. Our cross-sectional tests exploiting the affiliated director's committee membership reinforces our interpretation that making affiliated donations is a means by which the CEO befriends independent directors who provide favorable compensation packages in return.
Specification with director fixed effects
One alternative interpretation of our main results is that some omitted director characteristic affects both CEO compensation and corporate donations. For instance, a lenient director may both be lax about CEO pay setting and strive to solicit charitable donations from the firm. The previous results on compensation committee help mitigate such concerns because it is hard to argue that omitted director characteristics can also lead to committee membership, and further, the chairman status. To alleviate such concerns, we conduct additional analysis including director fixed effects.
We form a subsample of directors who serve on two corporate boards in the same year but with different affiliated donation status -one firm makes donations to charities affiliated with the director and the other firm does not. We then run the baseline regression using directoryear data and include director fixed effects in addition to the industry and year fixed effects.
Thus, the regression specification parses out time-invariant director characteristics that may affect both affiliated donations and CEO compensation, and the remaining variation captured by the coefficient on affiliated donations is, for the same director, the difference between receiving and not receiving a donation from the firms.
The results, summarized in Table 5 , are consistent with the results of the baseline regressions as reported in Table 4 . Affiliated donations are significantly and positively related to CEO total pay and negatively related to CEO portfolio delta. Thus, the effect of affiliated donations on CEO compensation is unlikely to be a manifestation of some omitted director characteristics that affect both corporate donations and CEO pay practices.
Subsample analysis
To further substantiate our interpretation that affiliated donations are a means by which the CEO befriends independent directors, which jeopardizes board monitoring, we explore whether the effect of affiliated donations on CEO compensation is attenuated by strong corporate governance. We consider a list of governance measures: board characteristics (board independence based on the conventional definition, board independence corrected for social connections between independent directors and the CEO, board independence corrected for director co-option, fraction of busy independent directors on the board, and board size), outside directors' ownership, ownership of top five institutional investors, and CEO tenure. The cutoff points for forming subsamples are the sample medians for all variables except board independence corrected for director co-option, which uses a cutoff point of 50% to capture majority independence. 5 We run the baseline regression for CEO total pay and portfolio delta (leaving out the sorting governance measure in each regression) in each subsample, and compare the coefficient estimate of affiliated donations between two subsamples. If affiliated donations negatively affect monitoring effectiveness, we expect such effects to be particularly strong in poorly governed firms where the effort of the CEO to befriend independent directors is more likely to be fruitful.
The results, presented in Table 6 , are consistent with our hypothesis. For all measures of corporate governance, the effects of affiliated donations on CEO total pay and portfolio delta are much stronger in the weak governance subsample (the first two columns) than in the strong governance subsample (the last two columns). The differences in the coefficient estimate of affiliated donations between two subsamples are largely statistically significant. More specifically, the effects of affiliated donations on CEO compensation are larger and statistically significant in the subsamples with less independent boards based on all three definitions of director independence, while they are statistically insignificant and economically small in the subsamples with more independent boards. The effects of affiliated donations on CEO compensation are also stronger in the subsamples with a high fraction of busy directors, low ownership by top five institutional investors, and long CEO tenure. These results corroborate the hypothesis that poor governance exacerbates the distortion of compensation practices by affiliated donations. Interestingly, the effects of affiliated donations on CEO compensation are stronger at firms with smaller boards, which are typically used as a proxy for strong corporate governance (Yermack 1996) , perhaps because an affiliated director has more influence on board decisions on a small board than on a large board.
CEO compensation and board independence -revisit the link
After establishing the effects of affiliated donations on CEO compensation, we redefine board independence and examine its relation to CEO compensation. Following the literature that redefines board independence by correcting for social connections between conventionally independent directors and the CEO (Hwang and Kim 2009) and that corrects for co-option of conventionally independent directors (Coles et al. 2016), we define a director as independent if the director is conventionally independent and is not affiliated with any charities that receive donations from the firm. We then compute board independence as the fraction of the redefined "independent" directors.
We run the baseline regressions of CEO total pay and portfolio delta using board independence defined under four definitions (conventional, social connections excluded, coopted directors excluded, and affiliated donations excluded). These regressions exclude the social connections, director co-option, and affiliated donations dummies while retaining all other explanatory variables including the fixed effects. We first include the four board independence variables one by one, and then include all four measures in one regression to conduct a horse race.
The results reported in Table 7 suggest that board independence, when corrected for corporate donations to charities affiliated with conventionally independent directors, is a significant determinant of CEO compensation. Specifically, a higher fraction of independent directors after correcting for affiliated donations is associated with lower CEO pay and more equity incentives. In contrast, other board independence measures are not significantly related to CEO compensation.
Financial Reporting Quality and Forced CEO Turnover
In this section, we examine the effects of affiliated donations on the outcomes of other board monitoring decisions, starting with looking at financial reporting quality. We run similar regressions in Panel B and Panel C where the dependent variables are
Opacity and JustMorB. These alternative reporting quality measures give us mostly consistent results. Overall, we find lower financial reporting quality in firms that make affiliated donations to audit committee, especially when this affiliated donation is related to audit committee chairs, to multiple audit committee members, or to a larger fraction of the committee. These findings are consistent with our hypothesis that affiliated donations compromise the independence of conventionally independent directors and impair their monitoring incentives.
Forced CEO turnover
We next examine the effect of affiliated donations on the link between forced CEO turnover and firm performance. If affiliated donations are made (or approved) by the CEO to cultivate relationship with independent directors, we expect such practices to weaken the forced CEO turnover-to-performance sensitivity. We define forced turnover following Parrino (1997) and regress it on stock return and control variables. While stock return should be negatively related to CEO forced turnover absent affiliated donations, we predict that such a negative relation should be weaker at firms making affiliated donations. turnover is significantly and negatively associated with both contemporaneous and lagged stock returns. In contrast, forced CEO turnover is not significantly related to contemporaneous stock return when affiliated donations are made. The difference in the contemporaneous turnover-toperformance sensitivity between firms with and without affiliated donations is marginally significant (p-value=0.13). The turnover-to-lagged performance sensitivity is significant for both groups of firms but the difference between the two is not statistically significant (p-value=0.84).
Thus, it seems that affiliated donations reduce the likelihood that a CEO is fired immediately for poor performance, although they do not significantly alter the likelihood that the CEO gets fired for past poor performance. 6 We then contrast firms making "less intense" affiliated donations and those making "more intense" affiliated donations. A firm is classified as making "less intense" affiliated donations if it makes donations to charities affiliated with fewer than three independent directors, and classified as making "more intense" affiliated donations if it makes donations to charities affiliated with three or more independent directors. The results in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 , Panel B show a significant difference in the CEO forced turnover-to-performance sensitivity for both contemporaneous and lagged performance. That is, when there are three or more affiliated directors on the board, the CEO is not fired for current or past poor performance. The same results obtain when we classify "less intense" and "more intense" affiliated donations based on 6 In untabulated tests, we analyze the effect of affiliated donations on forced CEO turnover based on whether the affiliated director is on the compensation, audit, governance, or nomination committees of the board. We find no significant contemporaneous CEO turnover-to-performance sensitivity in any of the subsamples. The sensitivity of CEO turnover-to-lagged performance is only statistically significant in the audit committee subsample. Thus, it seems that a joint force among all committees of the board makes the CEO firing decision.
the sample median fraction of affiliated directors (see Columns 3 and 4). This result is consistent with the literature on the importance of a critical mass (three or more directors) on a corporate board on board decisions (Schwartz-Ziv 2016).
7
Overall, the results on forced CEO turnover suggest that affiliated donations are associated with lower CEO turnover-to-performance sensitivity. When a firm makes donations affiliated with independent directors, the CEO is less likely to be fired immediately for poor performance. The CEO is also less likely to be fired for last year's poor performance if the firm makes charitable donations affiliated with three or more board members, or with a large fraction of the board.
Conclusion
This paper shows that corporate charitable contributions to independent directorsaffiliated charities are associated with less effective monitoring and are suggestive of an agency problem. It contributes to the literature of corporate governance by uncovering a new determinant of director independence, incremental to those identified based on business transactions and social connections.
7 There seems to be a difference in the CEO turnover-to-performance sensitivity between firms not making affiliated donations (Panel A, Column 1) and those making "less intense" affiliated donations. We check the statistical significance of these differences, but do not find systematic evidence supporting a significant difference (p-values range from 0.13 to 0.86). 
Appendix. Variable Definitions

Donation variables: D(Affiliated donation)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if a firm makes at least one donation to a charity affiliated with an independent director of the firm in the year, and 0 otherwise. Ln(1+ Affiliated donation in $thousand)
Logarithm of 1 plus all donations in a firm-year made to charities affiliated with independent directors of the firm, in thousands of dollars. D(Affiliate donation related to compensation committee)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if a firm makes at least one donation to a charity affiliated with an independent director of the firm who serves on the compensation committee in the year, and 0 otherwise. D(Donation made to compensation committeechair-affiliated charity)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if a firm makes at least one donation to a charity affiliated with the chair of the compensation committee, and 0 otherwise. D(Donation made to compensation committeemember-affiliated charity)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if a firm makes at least one donation to a charity affiliated with a non-chair member of the compensation committee, and 0 otherwise.
D(# of affiliated comp. committee >= 2)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if a firm makes donations to charities affiliated with 2 or more members of the compensation committee, and 0 otherwise.
D(# of affiliated comp. committee = 1)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if a firm makes donations to charities affiliated with only 1 member of the compensation committee, and 0 otherwise.
D(Above median % of affiliated comp. committee)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the fraction of independent directors on the compensation committee whose affiliated charities receive the firm's donations exceeds or equals the sample median, and 0 otherwise.
D(Below median % of affiliated comp. committee)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the fraction of independent directors on the compensation committee whose affiliated charities receive the firm's donations is less than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. D(Affiliate donation unrelated to comp. committee)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if a firm makes at least one donation to a charity affiliated with an independent director of the firm who does not serve on the compensation committee in the year, and 0 otherwise. D(Affiliated donation related to audit committee) Indicator that takes the value of 1 if a firm makes at least one donation to a charity affiliated with an independent director of the firm who serves on the audit committee in the year, and 0 otherwise. D(Donation made to audit committee-chair-affiliated charity)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if a firm makes at least one donation to a charity affiliated with the chair of the audit committee, and 0 otherwise. D(Donation made to audit committee-memberaffiliated charity)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if a firm makes at least one donation to a charity affiliated with a non-chair member of the audit committee, and 0 otherwise.
D(# of affiliated audit committee >= 2)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if a firm makes donations to charities affiliated with 2 or more members of the audit committee, and 0 otherwise. D(# of affiliated audit committee = 1)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if a firm makes donations to charities affiliated with only 1 member of the audit committee, and 0 otherwise. D(Above median % of affiliated audit committee)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the fraction of independent directors on the audit committee whose affiliated charities receive the firm's donations exceeds or equals the sample median, and 0 otherwise.
D(Below median % of affiliated audit committee)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the fraction of independent directors on the audit committee whose affiliated charities receive the firm's donations is less than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. D(Affiliated donation unrelated to audit committee)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if a firm makes at least one donation to a charity affiliated with an independent director of the firm who does not serve on the audit committee in the year, and 0 otherwise.
D(Unaffiliated donation)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if a firm makes donations to charities unaffiliated with any independent directors of the firm in the year, and 0 otherwise. we run five separate regressions for each of year t-4 to year t. In each regression, total current accruals of a firm is regressed on 1) lagged, contemporaneous, and leading cash flows from operations; 2) change in sales; and 3) property, plant, and equipment. Total current accruals equals change in current assets minus change in current liabilities minus change in cash and short-term investments plus change in current debt. For each firm-year, opacity is the standard deviation computed across the residuals of total current accruals from the five industry-year regressions. The definition follows Billett and Yu (2016) . JustMorB
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the firm's annual reported earnings per I/B/E/S equals or exceeds consensus analyst forecasts by one cent, and zero otherwise. D (Forced CEO turnover) Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is fired from the firm in the year, and 0 otherwise. We thank Ted Fee, Charlie Hadlock, and Kai Li for providing the data on forced turnover. Whether a CEO is forced out is determined based on Parrino (1997) and Jenter and Kanaan (2015) . For more details about the turnover data, see Fee and Hadlock (2003) , Gao, Harford, and Li (2015) , Jenter and Kanaan (2015) , and Peters and Wagner (2014).
Firm financials:
Ln(Assets) Logarithm of total book assets. Total book assets are in millions of dollars.
Stock return
Annual stock return as reported in ExecuComp.
ROA
Operating income before depreciation, divided by total book assets. M/B
The sum of the market value of equity and total book assets minus total common equity, all divided by total book assets. The market value of equity is the fiscal year end stock price multiplied by total number of shares outstanding.
Stock return volatility
The standard deviation of daily stock returns in each year. Debt/Assets
The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total book assets.
R&D/Assets
Research and development expenditure divided by total book assets. A&D/Assets Advertisement expenditure divided by total book assets. Loss
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the revenue is negative is any of the previous three years, and 0 otherwise. Indicator that takes the value of 1 if any independent director is connected to the CEO through prior work (for profit or non-profit) or education, and 0 otherwise. D(Above median fraction of co-opted directors)
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the fraction of co-opted directors is above median, and 0 otherwise. A director is co-opted if she is hired after the current CEO takes position.
Top five institutions' ownership
Total ownership by the top five institutions with the most holdings of the firm.
Director pay
Average director pay at a firm in a given year.
Note: All variables (except indicators) are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. The decision to make affiliated donations takes the value of 1 in firm-years with affiliated donations, and 0 otherwise. The decision to make unaffiliated donations takes the value of 1 in firm-years making donations not affiliated with independent directors, and 0 otherwise. The amount of unaffiliated donation is the total amount of donations unaffiliated with independent directors for the firm-year. Marginal effects of the coefficients are reported. All regressions include industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. Industries are Fama-French 12 industries. We report t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in the parentheses below the corresponding regression coefficients. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 5 . Effect of affiliated donations on CEO compensation, director fixed effects specification
The sample includes directors that sit on two boards in a given year where D(Affiliated donation) equals 1 in one board and equals 0 in another board. Portfolio Delta is in $million. All regressions include industry fixed effects, year fixed effects, and director fixed effects. Industries are Fama-French 12 industries. We report t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in the parentheses below the corresponding regression coefficients. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 4 , Panel A excluding the sorting variable. Industries are Fama-French 12 industries. We report t-statistics of the coefficients based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in the parentheses below the corresponding regression coefficients. ***, **, and * beside the coefficients denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. For each dependent variable and in each panel, the superscripts a, b, and c beside the t-statistic denote statistical significance of the difference in coefficients between the two subsamples at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 7 . Board independence redefined and its relation to CEO compensation CEO total pay is in thousands of dollars and portfolio delta in millions of dollars. Board independence is the fraction of independent directors following various definitions. All regressions include industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. Industries are Fama-French 12 industries. All regressions include the same firm and CEO control variables as in Table 4 , Panel A, although their coefficients are omitted. We report t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in the parentheses below the corresponding regression coefficients. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 9 . Effect of affiliated donations on forced CEO turnover
The dependent variable is forced turnover, which is 1 if there is a forced turnover, and 0 if there is no turnover. Probit models are used and marginal effects of the coefficients are reported. All regressions include industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. Industries are Fama-French 12 industries. We report t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in the parentheses below the corresponding regression coefficients. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
